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Abstract
We theoretically study the effect of a third person enforcement on
a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game played by two persons, with whom
the third person plays repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that
the possibility of the third person’s future punishment causes them to
cooperate in the one-shot game.
1 Introduction
Three players play a specific repeated game, in which the stage game is the
prisoner’s dilemma game illustrated in Table 1, where P = 45, S = 10, T =
100, R = 75. In the first stage, players X1 and X2 play the prisoner’s dilemma
game as the stage game. From the second stage, players M and X1 play the
stage game with probability 1/2. Players M and X2 also play the stage game
with probability 1/2. That is, player M plays the stage game with certainty.
Players X1 and X2 play the stage game with probability 1/2. They play the
game an infinite number of times, with a discount factor of δ = 3/4. We assume
that each player observes only the outcome of the stage game that s/he plays.
For example, player M cannot see the action profile of the first stage.
Players X1 and X2 play the stage game against each other only once. How-
ever, it is possible that they both play C in the first stage because a third person,
player M , may enforce cooperation. We analyze whether both players X1 and
X2 play C in a sequential equilibrium.
Kandori (1992) showed that a contagious strategy constitutes a cooperative
equilibrium in a private monitoring setting if the discount factor is sufficiently
large. In section 3 of this paper, we show that the Kandori (1992)-type conta-
gious strategy cannot constitute a cooperative equilibrium under the parameter
settings of this paper. In section 4, we show that another type of strategy profile
constitutes a sequential equilibrium.
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Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
2 Notation
We denote by (a1a2) the outcome of the first stage in which player X1 plays
a1 and player X2 plays a2, where a1, a2 ∈ {C,D}. From the second stage,
either player X1 or player X2 is chosen to play the stage game. To identify the
selected player, we denote by (XiaiaM ) the stage t outcome in which player Xi
is selected and plays ai and player M plays aM . For example, (X1CD) is the
stage outcome in which player X1 plays C and player M plays D. We denote
by (a11a
1
2;Xia
2
i a
2
M ; . . . ;Xja
t
ja
t
M ) the history of the outcome up to stage t. Let
Ht be the set of histories up to stage t. The behavioral strategy of player Xi
at stage t depends on the history up to stage t − 1. The behavioral strategy
at stage t of player Xi is described by the function σ
t
i : H
t−1 → {C,D}. By
contrast, the behavioral strategy of player M depends on who the opponent
is. The behavioral strategy of player M is described by the function σtM :
Ht−1 × {X1, X2} → {C,D}. When we do not specify player, we use z. For
example, (XzDD;XzDD) means that one of the following outcomes occurs:
(X1DD;X1DD), (X1DD;X2DD), (X2DD;X1DD), (X2DD;X2DD). When
we do not specify action, we use Z. For example, (X1ZZ) means that one
of the following outcomes occurs: (X1CC), (X1CD), (X1DC), (X1DD). We
denote the sequence of σti by σi; i.e., σi = (σ
1
i , σ
2
i , . . . ). We denote the sequence
of σtM by σM . Let σ = (σ1, σ2, σM ).
3 The contagious strategy
In this section, we show that a Kandori (1992)-type contagious strategy
cannot constitute a sequential equilibrium under the parameter settings of this
paper. A player who plays a contagious strategy plays D if her/his opponent
has previously played D against her/him. For example, if player X1 plays D
against player M , then player M plays D not only against player X1, but also
against player X2. If s/he has previously played D against a player, then s/he
again plays D against that player. 1 For example, if player M plays D against
player X1, then player M uses strategy D against player X1. Otherwise, s/he
plays C.
When playerM observes a deviation by her/his opponent, s/he assumes that
the deviation occurred in the first stage if it is a reasonable deviation. Suppose
1Because our game setting is different from that of Kandori (1992), the behavioral strategy
is slightly different from Kandori (1992)’s contagious strategy. That is, even if s/he has played
D against player X1, s/he plays C against player X2.
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player M observed (X1CC;X2DC) in the second and third stages. There are
two explanations: (i) player X1 or player X2 played D in the first stage, but
player X1 played C even though X1 was supposed to play D; (ii) there was no
deviation in the first or second stage, but player X2 deviates in the third stage
for the first time. We assume that player M follows (i) and that the player M
uses D against both other players.
We can constitute a sequence of assessments with completely mixed strate-
gies that is consistent with the contagious strategy profile and with beliefs that
satisfy the above principle. Let γ be the mixed strategy such that strategy C is
played with probability 1/2 and strategy D is played with probability 1/2. Let
σˆ be the contagious strategy. We can base a complete mixed strategy σ˜ on σˆ
with ǫ > 0 as follows:
σ˜1i (∅) = (1 − ǫ)σˆ
1
i (∅) + ǫγ for i ∈ {1, 2}
σ˜ti(CD; . . . ) = (1− ǫ)σˆ
t
i(CD; . . . ) + ǫγ for i ∈ {1, 2}, t > 1
σ˜ti(DC; . . . ) = (1− ǫ)σˆ
t
i(DC; . . . ) + ǫγ for i ∈ {1, 2}, t > 1
σ˜tM (ZZ; · · · | Xi) = (1− ǫ)σˆ
t
M (ZZ; · · · | Xi) + ǫγ for i ∈ {1, 2}, t > 1
σ˜ti(CC; . . . ) = (1− ǫ
1/ǫ)σˆi(CC; . . . ) + ǫ
1/ǫγ for i ∈ {1, 2}, t > 1.
We can base the belief µǫ on σ˜ by Bayes’ rule. Taking the limit as ǫ → 0, σ˜
converges to σˆ and µǫ converges to a belief that satisfies the above principle.
This is because limǫ→0 ǫ
1/ǫ/ǫk = 0 for all k ∈ N.
The payoff of player Xi from the contagious strategy profile is R+δR/(2(1−
δ)). If player Xi plays D in every stage, her/his payoff is T +δT/2+δ
2P/(2(1−
δ)). If δ ≥ 0.752903, R + δR/(2(1 − δ)) ≥ T + δT/2 + δ2P/(2(1 − δ)). If
δ = 3/4 = 0.75, which is the parameter setting in this paper, the contagious
strategy profile cannot be a sequential equilibrium.
4 A cooperative equilibrium
In this section, we consider a variation of the contagious strategy and show
that the new strategy profile σ constitutes a sequential equilibrium. As with the
contagious strategy, this strategy is to play D forever if s/he observed that one
of his/her opponents deviated from the strategy. For example, player M plays
D against X1 if player M observed that player X2 deviated from the strategy
profile. The difference between our strategy and the contagious strategy relates
to the behavioral strategy in the third stage. If player Xi is selected in the
second stage and player Xj(j 6= i) is selected in the third stage, then player
Xj is allowed to play strategy D in the third stage . In this case, the outcome
in the third stage is (XjDC). Thereafter, player M and player Xj continue to
choose C. On the other hand, if player Xi is selected in the second and third
stages, then player Xi must play C in the third stage. In this case, if player Xi
plays D in the third stage, then player M plays D thereafter.
For example, (CC;X1CC;X1CC;XzCC;XzCC;XzCC; . . . ) or
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(CC;X1CC;X2DC;XzCC;XzCC; . . . ) are outcomes on the path of the strat-
egy.
Formal definitions of σ are as follows:
Definition 1.
σ1
1
(∅) = σ1
2
(∅) = C
σ21(CC) = σ
2
2(CC) = C
σ2M (ZZ | Xi) = C for i ∈ {1, 2}
σ3i (CC;XiCC) = C for i = {1, 2}
σ3i (CC;XjCC) = D for i, j = {1, 2}, where j 6= i
σ3M (ZZ;XzCC | Xz) = C
σ3M (ZZ;XiCD | Xj) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where j 6= i
σ4i (CC;XiCC;XiCC) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j
σ4i (CC;XiCC;XjZZ) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j
σ4i (CC;XjZZ;XiDC) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j
σ4i (CC;XjZZ;XjZZ) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j
σ4M (ZZ;XiCC;XiCC | Xi) = C for i = {1, 2}
σ4M (ZZ;XiCZ;XiCZ | Xj) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j
σ4M (ZZ;XiCC;XjZZ | Xi) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j
σ4M (ZZ;XiCZ;XjDC | Xj) = C for i, j = {1, 2}, where i 6= j .
The behavioral strategy played up to stage 4, which is not listed above, is D.
From the fifth stage, the strategy is the same as the contagious strategy. That
is, if a player plays D after the fifth stage, her/his opponent subsequently plays
D and s/he subsequently plays D against the opponent.
When player M observes a deviation by her/his opponent, as in section
3, player M presumes that this deviation occurred in the first stage if it is
reasonable. On the other hand, if player M observes (X1CC;X2CC), s/he
does not assume that the deviation occurred in the first stage because it is
unreasonable. As in section 3, a belief that satisfies the above principle is the
limit of the beliefs based on the complete mixed strategy.
We show that the above strategy profile constitutes a sequential equilibrium
for δ = 0.75.
Theorem 1. σ constitutes a sequential equilibrium if δ = 0.75, P = 45, S =
10, T = 100, R = 75.
Proof. We investigate the following cases.
Case 1 (in which (XiDD) is assumed to be played in the strategy profile σ):
The stage payoff obtained from playing C is lower than that obtained from
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playing D. Regardless of the action s/he takes, the opponent continues
to play D in subsequent stages. Playing C never improves the payoff
obtained from the next stage. Thus, there is no incentive to deviate.
Case 2 (in which there is no deviation and in which (XiCC) is assumed to be
played in the strategy profile in the second stage or later): The expected
continuation payoff obtained by playerXi from playing C is R+δR/(2(1−
δ)) = 187.5. The expected continuation payoff obtained by player Xi from
playing D is, at most, T + δP/(2(1− δ)) = 167.5. Thus, player Xi has no
incentive to deviate. It is easily checked that the same applies for player
M .
Case 3 (in which, after playing (CC;XiCC), player Xj(j 6= i) is selected to
play in the third stage): Clearly, player Xj has no incentive to deviate be-
cause player Xj is expected to play D. Player M ’s expected continuation
payoff from playing C is S+δR/(1−δ) = 235. PlayerM ’s expected contin-
uation payoff from playing D is, at most, P +δ/2× (P +R)/(1−δ) = 225.
Thus, there is no incentive to deviate.
Case 4 (in which player M gets to choose an alternative in the second stage):
The expected continuation payoff for player M from playing C is R +
δR/2 + δS/2 + δ2R/(1− δ) = 275.625. The expected continuation payoff
for player M from playing D is, at most, T + δ(S/2 + P/2) + δP/(2(1 −
δ)) + δR/(2(1− δ)) = 255.625. Thus, there is no incentive to deviate.
Case 5 (in which the first stage outcome is (CD) and the current stage outcome
is assumed to be (XiDC)): The expected continuation payoff for player
Xi from playing D is T +δP/(2(1−δ)) = 167.5. The payoff obtained from
playing C is, at most, R + δT/2 + δ2P/(2(1 − δ)) = 163.125. Note that
player M adopts a type of contagious strategy. Player M plays D against
Xi after player M plays against Xj(j 6= i). If player Xi continues to
play C whenever player M does not play against Xj(6= Xi), the expected
continuation payoff is:
R+ δ
R
2
+
1
2
∑
s=2
δs
{(
1
2
)s−1
R+ (1 −
(
1
2
)s−1
)P
}
= R+ δ
R
2
+
1
2
(
δ2(R− P )
2− δ
+
δ2P
1− δ
)
= 160.5.
Thus, there is no incentive to deviate in this case.
Case 6 (in which player Xi gets to choose an alternative in the first stage): If
player Xi plays C, the expected continuation payoff is R+ δR/2+ δ
2(R+
T )/4 + δ3R/(2(1− δ)) = 191.016. If player Xi plays D in the first stage,
the expected continuation payoff is, at most, T + δT/2+ δ2P/(2(1− δ)) =
188.125. Thus, there is no incentive to deviate in this case.
5
The above results show that our strategy profile constitutes a sequential
equilibrium strategy.
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